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In recent years questions have been  raised about  the substitutability 
of  pension and other wealth. Reviewing research on this issue, one must 
conclude  that statistical  analysis  has  rather  more  than  exhausted  the 
potential  of  available data to supply  answers to these  questi0ns.l  The 
new Survey of  Income Program Participation  (SIPP)2 could be designed 
to collect the data required for answering better these and other  ques- 
tions of  family decision making in a lifetime planning context. 
In this paper I use the substitutability of  pension and other wealth  as 
an example of  data collection capabilities which SIPP should have. Poli- 
cy  analysts in  estimating or testing postulated  theoretical  relationships 
should not be forced by unnecessary data limitations into such tortured 
reasoning and farfetched estimating expedients that the interpretation of 
their research results is too doubtful to admit of  definite conclusions. We 
need a survey vehicle which is responsive to policy analysis requirements, 
whatever these may be at any time. I would hope that SIPP will be de- 
signed to collect data such as those which I identify in this paper. But I 
emphasize that mine is merely  one of  many examples of  data require- 
ments that SIPP should be able to satisfy. 
This paper is a constructive criticism of  economic measurement,  not 
of  economic  analysis.  Three comments  may  be  made  on  that  state- 
ment. First, the set of measurements criticized  and for which I propose 
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289 290  Nelson McClung 
reforms is defined by the data requirements of  models of  family lifetime 
savings plans.  There  are many  models  of  the  family  lifetime  savings 
process. A  simple and easily accessible one is that of  Laurence  Kotli- 
koff  (1979). Mordecai Kurz  (1980) has developed  a model  which  is 
more complete and is better formulated for estimation. Second, no im- 
plication is intended that these or any other economic models are beyond 
criticism; it is  just  that I choose not  to critique models in  this  paper. 
Third, the set of  economic measurements  considered is  not  necessarily 
that most deserving of  criticism. 
8.1  Concept of  Transfers 
Pensions are transfers. To appreciate  their economic significance we 
need to distinguish transfers  from transactions  which are not transfers. 
There are two concepts of  transfers: the theoretical and the institution- 
aL3 Only the institutional  has been measured  at all well.  However, for 
behavioral analysis, only the theoretical is of  any interest. 
In the National  Income  Accounts,  Disposable  Income  differs from 
Personal Income  by the net of  transfers out over transfers in. The trans- 
fers out are mainly taxes and the transfers in are mainly grants through 
government programs. In equations which purport to explain consump- 
tion, saving or transfers, available micro equivalents of  Personal Income 
or of  Disposable Income are not correct nor are they the best concepts 
of  income that we could construct from family surveys. Personal Income 
does not include current period accruals of  capital gains and Disposable 
Income does not include taxes which may be voluntary allocations of in- 
come and does include charitable contributions and other outlays which 
may be as involuntary as any taxes. The Federal Personal Income Tax 
concept of  Taxable Income does not include state and local tax outlays 
or charitable contribution  outlays  even  though  they  may  be in  either 
case purchases of  services for personal use. What we require for behav- 
ioral analyses is a measure  in each period  for each family of  just  that 
income over which it has a degree of  control. There is no one measure 
that will satisfy all analysts in all applications. But, while analysts must 
choose, statisticians need not; they should collect income and outlay data 
in sufficient detail that analysts have appropriate choices of  measures. 
8.1.1  Transfers as Transactions 
Transfers  are transactions  ultimately  between  persons.  In common 
with all transactions, transfers engage two classes of  actors: payors and 
payees. We want  to distinguish  transfer  transactions  from other  trans- 
actions between persons, transactions in  consumption goods  (consump- 
tion) and transactions in assets (saving) or transactions in labor services 
and transactions  in  property  rentals.  With  suitable  definitions,  income 291  Relevance in Economic Measurement: Public Inheritances 
(Y)  equals output (0).  Consumption  (C),  saving  (S),  and  transfers 
out (TO)  may be an exhaustive classification of  income allocation trans- 
actions.  Wages  (W),  rentals  (P), and  transfers  in  (TZ)  may  be  an 
exhaustive classification of  income receipts transactions. Thus, aggregat- 
ing without  netting  across  units:  Y  E C +  S +  TO and 0 =  W +  P 
+  TI. An  alternative  and  for  certain  analyses  preferable  interpreta- 
tion of  this budget identity is that uses of  funds  (Y)  equal sources of 
funds (0).  On this alternative interpretation, S may be either a use or a 
source of  funds, depending upon the sign of  the net transactions on capi- 
tal account. In these identities there are some difficulties which I will try 
to resolve. 
8.1.2  Direct and Mediated Transfers 
One person may transfer resources (or command over resources)  to 
another directly  through  bequest  or gift.  Or the  transfer  may  be  ar- 
ranged through an intermediary.  These intermediaries may be business 
firms, governments or, of  course, other persons. Debt forgiveness is  an 
example of  a transfer  through  a business  firm. Tax financed grants are 
transfers mediated by governments. 
As transfer intermediaries, business firms fall into two classes : those 
which do a little and those which  do a lot. Firms  organized for profit 
do little transferring relative to gross income. Insurance companies, pen- 
sion funds, charitable foundations and universities do much more. How- 
ever, the meanest  governments  do relatively  more  than  all  but a  very 
few firms. Among governments, the federal is preeminent. The aggregate 
mediated  transfer  through  all intermediaries  is  very  large,  perhaps  a 
quarter to a third of  the national  output, but much depends upon how 
one counts. 
8.1.3  Transfers as Unrequited Transactions 
Most transactions, what we may call economic transactions, leave both 
transactors with a value after the transaction that is the same as or great- 
er than before. Transfer transactions  are noneconomic,  are not genuine 
exchange transactions,  because they leave grantors with  less value,  al- 
though  they may  leave grantees  with  greater value,  after  the  transfer 
than they had before. In general, there is  no way  to determine in  any 
one instance or in the aggregate whether the gain to grantees is greater 
or less than the loss to grantors. The rule in statistical practice is to val- 
ue transfers at apparent cost to grantors. But, as we shall see, apparent 
cost to grantors is not actual cost to grantors; actual cost is equal to or 
less than, possibly  much  less than,  apparent cost. That it may  be less 
weakens the case for measuring the institutional concept, for the valua- 
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The institutional definition of  transfers is merely a list of  transactions 
which are presumptively gratuitous on at least one side of  the exchange. 
But in these putative transfers there may be substantial elements of  com- 
pensation or consumption.  On  the other hand, transactions  not on the 
list in fact may have large gratuitous elements. Thus, we may see people 
cheerfully paying taxes; potential AFDC recipients  questioning whether 
they should take up the trade, given the meagerness of  the rewards; and 
electric  rate payors  complaining  that  they  are  being  ripped  off.  The 
question, then, is what to do. We could apply more imagination than we 
have in the past to measuring the theoretical concept of  transfers  but, 
to the extent that we must use measures of  institutional concepts in be- 
havioral analyses, we should be very careful in the interpretation of  our 
results. 
8.1.4  Asymmetry in Transfers 
A transaction which may be a transfer to one transactor may not be 
a transfer to the other. A person in paying his utility bill may think that 
he has received full value; yet, if  the utility  company would have sup- 
plied  in  a negotiated  deal the same  amount of  electricity  for half  the 
price, half of  the bill is a transfer in to the utility company, although it 
is not a transfer out to the person. Similarly, taxes paid by a person may 
be a transfer out to him but, if  the tax receipts are used by a government 
to purchase the labor services of  persons who but for the compensation 
would  not  supply  them,  the  amounts  received  are  not  transfers.  The 
services provided by government employees may be transfers in to users 
of the services. This asymmetry holds  for both  the theoretical  and the 
institutional concepts of  transfers. 
At this point, we  need  to modify  the  expressions  above  in  section 
8.1.1. They become 
Y =  C -+ S  -+ TOD -+ TOM 
O= W+PfTID+TIM 
where TOD is direct transfers out, TOM is mediated transfers out, TID 
is direct transfers in and TIM is mediated transfers in. The argument is 
that TOD # TID and TOM # TIM.  More generally, TO # TI, whether 
at the unit level or in the aggregate. Measures of  transfers  thus depend 
upon whether we add up the receipts (0)  side or the allocation (Y)  side 
of  family budgets. 
8.1.5  Transfers as Involuntary Transactions 
There is a presumption that transfers out are involuntary. But grantors 
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with their role in transfer transactions.  A person paying his taxes  may 
reason that in being able to continue living inside the country and out- 
side of jail he is better off  than if  he did not pay. The person giving to 
charity may be really buying the approval of  his neighbors. On the other 
hand, the child, who, having said grace, must now  confront the vege- 
tables may consider himself worse off  for the Lord’s beneficence. Never- 
theless, he may be better off  eating the vegetables than forgoing dessert. 
There are good reasons, as the Trojans discovered, for giving a gift horse 
an examination  before  accepting it.  Proceeding  along  these  lines,  we 
make transfers vanish, and all transactions become economic exchanges. 
There is  something to be  said for preserving  a distinction  between 
those transactions  which  a person  enters into for personal  advantage, 
absent external influences, and those which he acquiesces in from social 
coercion. The distinction, however, is one not easily preserved in statisti- 
cal measurements.  A  family’s disposable income properly  may be de- 
fined as family total income, somehow defined, minus involuntary trans- 
fers out or minus the sum of involuntary  and voluntary  transfers  out, 
depending upon one’s interest or confidence that the transfers out identi- 
fied as voluntary  or involuntary in fact really  are so. Statistical  mea- 
surements should be conducted so  as to give analysts  as much freedom 
as is feasible  either to classify only  involuntary  payments  as transfers 
out and only gratuitous receipts as transfers in or to include voluntary 
payments  among transfers  out and, illogical  as it may  be,  include re- 
ceipts which in fact are compensation among transfers in. 
8.1.6  Transfers and Consumption 
Primarily because they appear so much to be involuntary, taxes com- 
monly are considered transfers out. We distinguish between benefit  and 
equity taxes, but even with  respect to benefit  taxes, we  recognize  that 
generally some form of  coercion is necessary, else people would take the 
benefits  and not pay  the taxes.  In enclaves  of  rich families,  fortunate 
enough to have their own local government,  people pay  high  property 
taxes to buy schools, swimming pools, tennis courts, and other amenities 
through their local governments and recognized charities, contributions 
to which are deductible under the Federal Personal Income Tax on a par 
with state and local taxes. All of  these amenities are available at a price 
from private for-profit suppliers or through  governments and nonprofit 
institutions at a user charge. Prices and user charges paid, however, are 
not deductible under the Federal Personal Income Tax. If  the weighted 
average marginal Federal Personal Income Tax rate in a community is 
0.50, then the people of  the community can buy with local government 
property taxes tennis courts at half price. At that price, one may suppose 
that much of  the taxes paid is voluntary, a supposition reinforced by the 294  Nelson McClung 
evident responsiveness of local political processes.  Through its Personal 
Income  Tax the federal  government  subsidizes  socialism  for  the  rich. 
In promoting socialism one sensibly might begin by coopting the rich. 
The point for our purposes is that there is no clear distinction between 
equity and benefit  taxes and, hence,  no neat  statistical  distinction  be- 
tween transfers  out and consumption expenditures.  As  a  consequence, 
estimated elasticities of consumption with respect to income depend upon 
specific institutional arrangements. Imagine what would be the case were 
the oft-made suggestion adopted for setting the income tax rate equal to 
the ratio of  federal expenditures to aggregate taxable income and allow- 
ing all taxpayers unlimited deductions for contributions to federal agen- 
cies for specified purposes, such as fish and wildlife conservation. Little 
or no tax would be collected  and measured personal consumption out- 
lays would increase by nearly total present income tax collections. The 
difference between  Personal  and Disposable  Income  that is  accounted 
for by  Federal Personal  Income  Tax  would  vanish.  However,  even 
though there is no precise demarcation between  transfers and consump- 
tion expenditures, we need not abandon theoretical refinement at the low 
level of  sophistication which we now do. The test should be whether pay- 
ments buy a family things  which it wants for its own personal use. On 
this test  most local property  tax payments would be classified as con- 
sumption  outlays.  There are,  as  we  know,  childless  persons  who  pay 
local property  taxes with  the thought  that government  schools at least 
keep little rascals  busy  and may  give them some marketable skills that 
offer them an alternative to growing up big.rascals. 
That brings up a related matter. In addition to personal consumption 
financed by tax and charitable contributions, we must recognize  direct 
or mediated vicarious consumption.  If  A's  consumption  enters into the 
utility function of  B, then it is usual to say that As  and B's utility func- 
tions are interdependent, although strictly speaking B's  utility merely is 
dependent on that of A. It may be that some people pay  taxes, make 
charitable  contributions  or direct  transfers  of  income  to others  from 
motives purely of  love. More commonly, perhaps, the payments  made 
are intended to motivate  and finance modifications  in  the behavior  of 
the recipients which are agreeable to the payors. To the extent that pay- 
ments are intended to change behavior and in fact do, they are compen- 
sation to receiving units for services rendered and consumption by pay- 
ing units. 
8.1.7  Transfers and Saving 
We observe people paying insurance premia, Federal Insurance Con- 
tributions  Act  and Self-Employment  Act  taxes  and  employee  pension 
plan contributions, if  we  accept that employer payments are distributed 
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other hand, we  observe  people receiving insurance  benefits,  OASDHI 
benefits and employee pensions. In  a strictly economic sense  the  pay- 
ments and receipts are current period transfers. Those who produce the 
output of a period  transfer command over some part of  that output to 
those  who have rights  under  these  government  and  private  programs. 
Yet, we have a problem with this view. In a period as short as one year, 
much wage income and perhaps most property income received are eco- 
nomic rents and, hence, transfers in. Even in a long run, some wage and 
much property income is economic rent: actual compensation for supply- 
ing labor and capital services is above owner supply prices. With respect 
to property income, this is  true if  people hold wealth for the control of 
businesses or, as implied by lifetime saving theory, for income averaging 
and, although sensitive to relative rates of  return, would engage in these 
activities almost irrespective of  the level of  returns. 
In making advance preparation for the financial consequences of  some 
bad outcome,  such  as death  and survivorship,  disability,  sickness,  un- 
employment, fire, theft, a person has a choice:  he may save or he may 
insure. All insurance is a scheme for averaging bad outcomes over more 
families  than suffer bad outcomes  in  any period.  It is  not always  ap- 
parent whether people  are insuring or saving. Saving, in a lifetime net 
zero saving model, is self-insuring and that is the root of  the difficulty. In 
simple term casualty insurance, a person  buys coverage in each period 
which  presumably  is  worth  the premium.  This is  a  consumption  (or 
business)  outlay. Insurance proceeds received in the event of a loss are 
merely an involuntary  asset conversion; in the normal case, apart from 
gain  (or loss)  on a conversion, the insurance proceeds net  against  the 
loss to zero. Contributions to employee pension plans may be regarded 
by  the  persons  covered  as  saving for retirement  (and perhaps  other 
events which result in a loss of  income). But, if  the plan is fully funded, 
all plan members, both those active and those retired, neither  save nor 
dissave:  plan contributions and interest receipts each period just match 
plan  benefit  payments  and  administrative  expenses  each  period.  The 
arrangement looks much like term insurance. 
There are two consistent treatments of  family pension saving. One is 
to classify certain family income allocations as transfers or saving from 
a knowledge of the extent to which the pension plans that they partici- 
pate in are not only advance funded but funding. The other is to classify 
all contributions and interest earnings as savings by families and net out 
the benefit payments in  aggregation.  Either we measure family income 
(1) inclusive of  transfers out and allocations to saving and exclusive of 
transfers in and withdrawals of  saving or we measure income  (2) ex- 
clusive of  transfers out and allocations to saving and inclusive of  trans- 
fers in and withdrawals of  saving. The first is a Haig-Simons concept of 
income; the second is a Fisher-Kaldor  concept. Basically, the choice is 296  Nelson McClung 
one between  accrual  and realization  accounting  for  income,  although 
Fisher measured income by accruals. The basic complication is in  dis- 
tinguishing between transfers out and saving. We would like to preserve 
a concept of  saving such that allocations of  income to saving by all fam- 
ilies sum to the amount that is  available for capital accumulation. How- 
ever, an individual family may regard  payment  of  FICA taxes  as pur- 
chasing a future interest not significantly different from that which could 
be acquired through personal saving. But FICA taxes finance no capital 
accumulation while personal saving does. 
8.1.8  Transfers and Wages 
In the administration  of  federal tax laws, cases come up commonly 
in which the issue is whether a payment is subject to gift tax payable by 
the payor or to  income tax payable  by  the payee.  Decisions  in  these 
cases turn on whether the transaction  is a transfer or compensation.  If 
the recipient modified his behavior in some significant manner with the 
expectation of  receiving  the payment,  the  presumption  is  that the  re- 
ceipt is compensation.  In fact, much  of  inheritances and gifts received 
is earned income; a larger fraction is earned than one would infer appiy- 
ing the rules which the courts use. 
In a more romantic age, Robin Hood took from the rich and gave to 
the poor. Modern day robbin’ hoods take from rich and poor and keep 
it all. In suits for restitution initiated by persons who have been swindled, 
for example, the IRS may interpose a tax lien, asserting that the value 
of  the property appropriated is earned income of  the swindler on which 
income tax is payable. The courts are rather inclined to regard the trans- 
action as a transfer on which neither gift nor income tax is due. 
From time to time suggestions  are made  for including AFDC pay- 
ments  in  the  Personal  Income  Tax  base.  The Personal  Income  Tax 
essentially is  a tax on factor incomes  before  tax.  Thus,  unless  one is 
proposing a fundamental redefinition of  the tax base, inclusion of  AFDC 
payments  must  rest on  an argument that they  are a factor income. If 
the children are regarded as wards of  the state and the mothers as hired 
caretakers, then one may argue that AFDC payments are wage income. 
If we assume that the mothers enjoy their children as do other parents, 
no deductions for outlays on the children would be allowed and the en- 
tire grant would be taxable compensation. From this perspective AFDC 
does not  necessarily  reduce  compensated  work  effort;  it may  increase 
the  total. But it changes  the  form; the  mothers,  instead  of  supplying 
labor outside the house, work at home. The taxes which finance AFDC 
payments  may  not be  transfers.  Present  generation  income  tax  payors 
may be investing in exemptions from military service for their children 
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OASI grants  will  be  maintained  when  the  present  active  generation 
retires. 
These examples are intended to suggest that wages and transfers can- 
not be distinguished with  much  precision.  I have mentioned  economic 
rents as a component of  wage income. These economic rents do not af- 
fect decisions to work a little more or less except through their effect on 
total income. But the neglect of  accruals of  wage income through  the 
accumulation of  pension rights may distort estimates of  the relationships 
of  labor supply, consumption and saving to total income or to wage in- 
come because  either  the  dependent  or independent variables  or both 
have been mismeasured. To assume in behavioral analysis that what  is 
usually  called  wage  income is  earned  (has an  opportunity  cost)  and 
what is usually called transfer income is unearned is to invite confusion. 
Estimated labor supply responses will be in error if  the measured mar- 
ginal wage  income in  fact is  nonwage income or if  the  true marginal 
wage income is erroneously classified as transfer income. 
8.1.9  Transfers and Property Income 
Old-fashioned socialists asserted that property income is theft.  New- 
fangled socialists recognize  that the old conclusions remain  as valid  as 
ever if  property income is subsumed under the more general heading of 
transfers.  In the period  in  which  they  are  received,  property  incomes 
are economic rents and, hence, transfers. 
In  one essential respect  property  incomes  cannot  be  distinguished 
from deferred compensation. Both are legally enforceable rights to com- 
mand over the outputs of  future periods. These rights are acquired ulti- 
mately through  saving out of  current period  income. But  they  are en- 
forceable only under law. Thus, both those who expect property incomes 
and  those who expect  to receive current period  earnings in future  pe- 
riods  must look  to government  for their  assurances.  Their claims  are 
never any better than the guarantees which government provides. Their 
claims indeed may be worth very little if  the government is irresponsible 
with the money supply or is overturned by redistributing revolutionaries, 
who are given to viewing all property income as “earned” by capitalists 
only through the efforts made by capitalists to maintain  control of  gov- 
ernment. 
8.1.10  Income and Wealth Transfers 
Transfers of  income are transfers of  present interests, that is, rights to 
dispose over  current  period  output.  In  statistical  practice,  the  period 
usually is the calendar year. Transfers of  wealth are transfers  of  future 
interests.  Future interests  may  be  classified  with  respect  to  transfer- 
ability and contingency. The right to receive property  income typically 298  Nelson McClung 
is transferable and noncontingent.  Property income receivable under  a 
trust may be qualified with  respect  to transferability and may be con- 
tingent upon the satisfaction of  certain conditions.  The right to receive 
pension income typically  is contingent upon  attaining  an age at which 
pensions  are payable,  being  disabled,  becoming unemployed  or dying 
(in the case of  a survivor pension)  and may be contingent upon  other 
circumstances, such as quitting employment with a firm or industry or, 
as with OASDI, leaving the wage labor force. Pension  rights  typically 
are not directly transferable. 
Present interests can be converted into future interests at some rate of 
interest and future interests  can be converted  into present  interests  at 
some rate of  discount. The rate at which any particular  interest can be 
converted is a market rate for that interest and that conversion. In any 
period, a family may convert present interests to future, future interests 
to present, both or neither. A family converts present interests to future 
interests  by  buying  physical  or financial  assets  or  own  debt held  by 
others; it converts future interests to present interests by selling physical 
or financial  assets or own debt. Subject to certain qualifications,  if  all 
families in any period  sought to convert all of  their future interests  to 
present interests, market discount rates would rise until the value of  all 
future interests fell to zero. However, usually some families are convert- 
ing one way and others another and indeed most families in any period 
are converting both ways. 
What is interesting for our purposes is  that the structure of  asset mar- 
kets is quite complex and not all families have equal access to all mar- 
kets. To simplify, assume that rates of  return on real assets for each fam- 
ily are equal to some lending rate to which it has access. We may relate 
family lending and borrowing  rates  to  family permanent  income  as  in 
the illustrative graph in figure 8.1. Federal  and  state tax  treatment of 
property income and interest expense affects the shape of  these curves. 
Their location for any family is affected by age and sex of  head, race 
and other  factor^.^ 
The curves shown in figure 8.1, with the indicated and other qualifica- 
tions, describe families’ opportunity cost of  funds. Suppose that a family 
has occasion to raise funds in some period. If  it is rich, it should bor- 
row; if  it is poor, it should sell assets. Alas, poor families have few assets 
to sell and the lending curve tends to  become undefined  below  an  in- 
come which I have indicated as  Y1.  Thus, poor families borrow but at 
higher rates than do rich families. 
The point is that the cost  (positive or negative)  of  shifting funds be- 
tween periods varies from one family to another, depending upon family 
income and other circumstances. Given that a family has some expected 
flow of  future income,  we  cannot  know  what  the present  value to the 
family is of  that flow until we  know its opportunity cost  of  funds,  the 299  Relevance in Economic Measurement: Public Inheritances 
r.i 
Fig. 8.1 
y,  Y 
The  Relation of  Family Lending and  Borrowing Rates  to 
Permanent Income 
lower of its accessible lending or borrowing rates.  It is incorrect  to use 
an interest or discount rate that may be appropriate for another family 
or even for the average of  all families unless one has an effective way of 
controlling  for  implicit  weighting.  Furthermore,  rates  which  are  ap- 
propriate  for transferable interests  are not  necessarily  appropriate  for 
nontransferable interests. One would  suppose that the transferable are 
lower  because  generally  transferable  interests  are more  valuable  than 
nontransferable.  By  the same token, noncontingent  interests  are worth 
more than contingent. 
8.1.1 1 
Transfers may be within or between generations. Generations may be 
defined in terms of  relationships or of  age cohorts.  Defined in terms of 
relationships, there may be  at any time a generation of  grandparents, a 
generation of  parents and a generation  of  children. Defined  as  age co- 
horts, there may be the class of  all persons aged 65 or more, those aged 
18 to 64 and those under  18. We can  specify age  cohort  generations 
such that there is  not a significant number of  two relational generations 
in a cohort. Fifteen years certainly is adequate and twenty might do. 
The problem  with relational  generations is that they require the col- 
lection of  data on a large number of  possible relationships of  persons in 
one household  to persons  in  other households. Samples must be suffi- 
ciently large that the relationships among persons in the sample are rep- 
resentative of  the relationships in the total population. The sample could 
be smaller if they were drawn from frames which had all of  the relation- 
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ships but these frames would be quite costly to construct. The alternative 
is the construction of  synthetic samples after the manner of  Guy Orcutt 
and his associates (1976). Otherwise, we are restricted to an age cohort 
concept of  generations and for some purposes this is  adequate. 
Given that there are transfers and that some of  these could be between 
age cohort generations, then the diagram shown in figure 8.2 may indi- 
cate the primary flows of  intergenerational  transfers. 
In this scheme, S is support and G is gifts. The distinction between sup- 
port and gifts may be thought of  as equivalent to that between  income 
and wealth transfers. Support is a transfer which normally  is consumed 
within  an income  accounting  period.  Gifts  are  transfers  not  normally 
consumed entirely in one accounting period. Gifts in this usage include 
bequests. Bequests, of  course, are made by living persons and differ from 
other transfers  only in having in  each individual  case an indeterminate 
although determinable effective date. 
The flows of  transfers are between minors  (K),  nonaged adults  (A) 
and aged adults (0).  If  we regard persons under 18 as minors and per- 
sons 65 years of  age and older as aged, then the nonaged adults are  18 
through  64. Within the  age  range  18 through  64,  there  may  be  three 
relational  generations;  in  the open  ended class of  aged,  there  may  be 
two; in the under 18 class, there may be one, if  for each class we ignore 
statistically  insignificant  higher  orders.  Transfers  between  relational 
generations within  an age cohort are treated as intragenerational  trans- 
fers in the three-cohort  classification suggested. 
For the most part, the flows A to K  are completed within nuclear fam- 
ily groupings and those 0  to K,  A to 0 and 0 to A within extended fam- 
ily groupings.  These direct  flows primarily  of  provision  of  goods  and 
services are intergenerational flows. They are mainly income flows. The 
allocation of  total flows between income and wealth transactions depends 
upon how  one chooses to treat  education  and  health  expenditures  by 
parents on their children. Assuming an accounting period as long as one 
year, doubtless no one would treat expenditures for children’s food and 
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clothing as wealth transactions.  The basic analytic problem in transac- 
tions within families is what part should be regarded as transfers from 
adults to children and what part should be regarded  as consumption by 
the adults. In contrast to direct flows, mediated  flows do not raise  SO 
serious an issue of  adult consumption, except in the flows A to 0.  Non- 
aged adults, in paying Social Security and income taxes to support aged 
adults through  OASI and SSI, may be substituting mediated for direct 
intergenerational  transfers.  If  having  the  old  folks  in  the house  is  a 
nuisance but the old folks would prefer  to live with their children,  the 
transactions are compensation for the abatement of  a nuisance and all 
gain. 
8.2  Transfers and Saving 
In this section I want to consider an issue in government policy:  does 
the availability of  transfers, particularly  intergenerational  transfers,  re- 
duce saving. The questions that come up are the following. (1) Does the 
promise  of  AFDC, legally  enforceable  if  eligibility is  established,  dis- 
courage poor young women and perhaps poor young men from making 
the human capital investments which could make them self-supporting? 
(2) If  OASI discourages saving, do not SSI and Veteran Pensions also? 
(3) If  OASI reduces saving, would not employee pensions do so equally 
when plans have become fully funded? (4) Should not bequests be taxed 
at a  100 percent  rate in  order to avoid  the  discouraging  effect of  in- 
heritances on saving? In each case, we  are concerned with the relation- 
ship of  transfers, direct or mediated, to saving. The general case is this: 
if  a person  has  a  reasonably  well  defined  consumption  ambition  (or 
standard of  living), any income expectation will contribute to the satis- 
faction of  that ambition. An expected increase in income from private or 
public inheritances or an expected reduction in transfers out will enable 
the person to maintain his standard of living with  less saving or lesser 
earnings from sales of  labor services or capital rentals. In this paper, I 
am considering effects on saving of  only one form of  public inheritance, 
a pension. 
8.2.1  Saving Models 
family model and the nuclear family model. 
Extended Family Model 
An  extended  family  usually  is  thought  of  as  a  multigenerational 
household in which the nonaged adults support the old and the young in 
a succession of  age cohort duties to support and rights to receive sup- 
port. In practice, each person in a family is expected to do his best; the 
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young who receive full support are very young and the old are very old. 
Some persons  in  the family,  the  disabled,  the  not  so old  and not  so 
young, make partial contributions to their support. However, members 
of an extended family need not all live together in one household. Gen- 
uine extended families from antiquity have maintained  members in dis- 
tant  abodes for long periods  as  traders,  branch  bankers, missionaries, 
students, and so on. The essential condition for a family to be an ex- 
tended family is  that  the association of  persons  include  at least  three 
generations  with  substantial  transfers  of  income  within  some  relevant 
time frame between  the nonaged  adults  and the  aged  adults  and from 
the adults to the children. There are other associations of  persons, such 
as associations of  adult siblings, which may be referred  to as extended 
families but  they  do not  have  the  same analytic  implications  as  the 
multiple  generation  family  and  should  be  called  perhaps  communes. 
Doubtless in  almost  all  extended  families  the members  are related  by 
blood or marriage. Furthermore,  the economic relationships among the 
members in the main are quid pro quo exchanges. For short periods of 
time, such as one year, it is recognition of  duties and rights  to support 
and not actual transfer transactions  which define the association as  an 
extended family. 
If  an extended family is large enough or has brought over adequate 
resources from the past, it need not save for consumption averaging pur- 
poses.  It may,  of  course,  save for estate building purposes. Now,  if  a 
family is self-insuring  against the risks  of  unemployment  and disability 
due to illness, injury  or old age  and  perhaps  does  not need  to insure 
against an unfavorable shift in  the age composition  of  its membership, 
the  introduction of  a compulsory  comprehensive scheme of  social in- 
surance will leave it overinsured.  It cannot compensate by  reducing its 
saving. If  it is saving for estate building or human capital formation, it 
can  build  faster  by  reducing  or changing  the  direction  of  intrafamily 
transfers  but, in  any event, it can reach its desired level of  risk-protec- 
tion only through reducing or redirecting intrafamily transfers.  Indeed, 
the  overinsured  argument  was  that made  by  certain  religious  sects in 
protesting coverage under OASDHI and, were we sure that they could 
keep their close-knit extended families from coming unraveled, the argu- 
ment would be sufficient for leaving them out. 
Robert Barro (1977) has attempted to infer  indirectly the effect of 
Social  Security transfers  on intrafamily transfers.  The data used  were 
macro time series constructed by BEA or others using similar methods. 
With all variables measured in annual real per capita units, he regresses 
consumer expenditures on (a) disposable personal income, current and 
lagged one year, (b) net corporate retained earnings,  (c) surplus of  the 
government sector, (d) net stocks of  capital or net wealth, (e) consumer 
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(OASDHI)  benefits.  To these independent  variables  he adds  (g)  an 
average annual unemployment rate. He finds that the effect on consumer 
expenditure of  either Social Security wealth or benefits using either the 
stock of capital  or net  worth  is  not  significantly different  from  zero. 
Thus, the effect on saving is not significant and family adjustments over 
the period since the  1920s to the introduction of  Social Security must 
have been substitutions  of  mediated  for  direct  transfers.  The substitu- 
tions could have been made through  (a) reduced  transfers  from non- 
aged to aged adults, (b) larger transfers  (gifts and bequests) from aged 
to nonaged adults that compensate them for the negative wealth  effect 
of FICA taxes or (c) larger transfers from nonaged  adults to children 
in order to enhance their earning capacity and thus reduce the burden 
of  FICA taxes which they will pay  when grown to finance the benefits 
their parents will receive. 
There are observations which lend credence to Barro’s inferences. For 
example, with  the growth  of  OASI grants, old people have tended  in- 
creasingly  to live in their  own rather  than  their  children’s households. 
That is presumptive evidence of  a reduction in intrafamily exchange and 
transfer transactions.  One would expect adjustments to the introduction 
of  OASI to take the form partially of  family reorganizations and it should 
be possible to identify these reorganizations in part from Current Popula- 
tion Surveys since the late  1940s and from  the  consumer  expenditure 
survey at about the time  that  OAI went into effect. However, it is the 
amount and direction of  transfer flows that define adjustments and these 
cannot be identified in the microdata.  Implicit evidence now is  all that 
we shall ever have for the past. Not even retrospective surveying could 
capture  these  distant  past  adjustments  now.  Nevertheless,  the  Barro 
evidence, although highly implicit, is support for his conclusions. It does 
not eliminate a third alternative: that people made no adjustments either 
to direct transfers or to saving. 
Uncertain  evidence as the Barro estimates are, there are problems of 
specification.  Barro regresses  consumer  expenditure,  a  realization  ac- 
counting concept, on BEA disposable income, also basically a realization 
accounting  concept. But Barro then  mixes  realization  and  accrual  ac- 
counting by introducing corporate  retained earnings as a proxy for the 
current period  accrual  of  capital gain  on corporate  shares. Accrual of 
gain on noncorporate  real estate is  reflected in the capital stock or net 
worth variables. The Barro model in common with all models estimated 
on macro time series data is quite sensitive to specification error, as he 
recognizes. Dropping the unemployment  variable,  he gets results  com- 
parable to those of Feldstein when estimating a similar model on similar 
data; that is, Social  Security  wealth  reduces  saving.  Keeping  the  un- 
employment variable, he gets estimates for the Social Security wealth CO- 
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National  Income  Accounts  there  are the misclassifications  of  transac- 
tions and other measurement errors which I consider in section 8.1 and 
suggest in section 8.3 could be  avoided in suitably planned  microdata 
collection. But, in addition, the techniques of  estimation used in the con- 
struction of  BEA and  related  macro  time  series  introduce  such  high 
orders of  autocorrelation in  each series and serial correlation  between 
series that the data give a researcher little help in choosing among com- 
peting hypotheses. Within each of  Barro’s several sets of  equations, the 
R2s differ only in the third and fourth places and, for two sets, round to 
1.0 at the third digit. No one can  believe that the world is  really  that 
thoroughly determined. 
Nuclear Family Model 
A  nuclear  family includes at most  two  generations  and  one but  no 
more than two adults. If  there are two adults, they  are related by mar- 
riage, somehow defined. The family may or may not include minor chil- 
dren. One adult living alone is  a nuclear family. This definition of  nu- 
clear family together with the extended family definition of  the previous 
section leaves some persons  in  limbo.  If  minors living  alone  are con- 
sidered adults, all in limbo are living in associations of  two or more per- 
sons and, as suggested in the previous section, these associations  might 
be called  communes. Communes would  include persons  living together 
in  group quarters and in institutions. The reason for not  putting  these 
associations of  persons  in  either  of  the classes of  extended  or nuclear 
families is the uncertainty  about whether such units can be considered 
reasonably to have a lifetime consumption  plan. 
Extended families have consumption planning horizons which may be 
indefinite but at least are not bounded by the life expectancies of  adult 
members at any time. Nor is the time path of  incoine conditioned by the 
earning capacities of  any one family member, if  the family is sufficiently 
large and/or well-heeled. For nuclear families, saving (positive or neg- 
ative) is a necessary device for averaging consumption over time. When 
income is higher  than the cost  of  maintaining its  standard  of living,  a 
family saves; when income is below the cost of  the standard, it dissaves. 
If  the standard is set realistically or the family suitably adjusts its work 
effort,  it just breaks even over its life span, barring surprises. A typical 
pattern is for a family to save during its active years, but perhaps only 
after a child rearing period, and dissave in retirement. 
For nuclear  families,  transfers  are of  no small  consequence.  There 
are, of  course, the intrafamily transfers from parents  to children. When 
the children leave the parent unit and go out to form nuclear families of 
their own, they do not go naked and alone. They begin their adult  life 
with  a  complement  of  skills,  attitudes  and  connections  which  can  be 
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stitution of a lifetime cumulative inheritance tax for the present federal 
estate tax. The value of  the initial endowments which children take from 
home would be the first term in the inheritance tax base. To avoid driv- 
ing people back  into extended  family  associations  we  might  value  the 
endowments at an arbitrary age, say 25. Keeping the Personal Income 
Tax, we would value the endowments at cost to the parents. Data on the 
cost of  rearing  children  suggest that the  Treasury  would  be enriched 
even at modest rates and an exemption equal to mean estimating error. 
Direct transfers between nuclear families are far from insignificant. They 
are merely grossly underestimated, in effect ignored, in available micro- 
data. If  we  are concerned  about the  effect of  transfers  on saving,  we 
should  pay  some attention  to direct  transfers.  Attention  thus  far has 
been  directed  only  toward  mediated  transfers  and  not  even  to  all  of 
them. 
There are two interesting sets of  estimates of  the effects of  mediated 
transfers on saving. Both  are in an implicit nuclear family context  and 
both sets of  estimates were made using microdata, a fact which by itself 
would make them interesting. The first study, by Martin Feldstein  and 
Anthony Pellechio (1  977), measures the effect of  OASI on saving. The 
second,  by  Alicia  Munnell  (1976), measures  the  effect  of  employee 
pensions on saving, along with the impact of  OASI. The models in both 
cases are variants of  the Ando-Modigliani lifetime consumption  (or sav- 
ing) model. Current period  saving by  each family  is  regressed  on the 
family’s current period  labor income, its  expected future labor  income 
and its holding of  net  wealth. Wealth  enters  the equations  in  two  (or 
three) components:  (a) noncontingent, transferable wealth,  (b) OASI 
wealth  and  (c) employee pension  wealth, Munnell only.  With  respect 
to OASI, the two studies come out at about the same place: OASI grants 
substitute  for personal  saving approximately  dollar  for  dollar in  life- 
time planning models. Private pension grants apparently substitute some- 
what less well. 
At first glance, these results are something of  a mystery. They suggest 
that people regard contingent and nontransferable future interests as al- 
most  or equally  as  good  as noncontingent  and  transferable  future  in- 
terests. Yet, when  a young man  receives an inheritance we  do not ob- 
serve him in the typical case running off to a life insurance company to 
buy a life annuity beginning at age 65 and subject to the restrictions to 
which  company or OASI  pension rights  are. The results,  thus,  would 
seem to require some interpretation. Perhaps, for the purposes for which 
income averaging saving is undertaken  at all, contingent and nontrans- 
ferable wealth serves essential purposes. Allowing for asset management 
expenses and temptations to fritter away the estate, it may be even better 
than noncontingent  and transferable  wealth. We know  next  to nothing 
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market  rates  of  return  give  us  average  opinions  but  only  for  traded 
assets. 
Every family, we may suppose, has certain saving objectives. One of 
these may be maintenance  of  a  standard  of  living  in  retirement  (or, 
more generally,  in the  event  of  any interruption in  wage  income). A 
family may be able to satisfy this objective by holding assets specialized 
to the purpose, that is, pension rights.  To the extent that this is so, we 
may observe both lifetime net zero and lifetime positive savers trading 
the accumulation of  other types of  claims on future output for pension 
rights.  This merely recognizes that the purchase,  for example, of  a life 
annuity beginning at age 65 may  make satisfactory provision for con- 
tingencies which are of  consequence only as long as one lives after age 
65. We might expect, as the Feldstein  and Pellechio and Munnell esti- 
mates  suggest,  that lifetime  net  zero  savers  would  hold  only  pension 
wealth  and that lifetime  positive  savers would  hold at least  some. For 
either to hold  pension  wealth,  they  must  have  access to these  claims. 
Given access, the choice of  how much pension wealth a family can hold 
typically is severely constrained. It is likely that there are families some 
of whom hold less and others more of  this wealth than they would were 
they able to choose without constraint. 
For some families, and perhaps for most families to some extent, the 
nontransferability  of  pension  claims  may  give  pensions  an  advantage 
over other claims. Pension claims, thus, are not unlike spendthrift trusts. 
Restrictions  on dissipation may be not only accepted but welcomed by 
persons covered by pension plans,  as they often are by spendthrifts,  as 
protection  from  their  own  too  generous  dispositions.  It may  be  con- 
venient but certainly it is unnecessary to assert that the persons holding 
pension claims care nothing for their potential  heirs. This is  not neces- 
sarily true even of  those persons who hold  only pension wealth. These 
people may make inter vivos donations of  human and nonhuman capital 
to their  children  and others which  satisfy  any  reasonable  bequeathing 
motive. And holders of  other claims may do so for motives of control 
or of social status and in fact care nothing for potential heirs. 
A  final advantage  is  the  tax  treatment  of  pension  relative  to  other 
saving. Where the option is available, a given financial contingency can 
be provided for with less sacrifice of current consumption through pen- 
sion than through other saving. In the case of  OASI, half  of  contribu- 
tions and all of  implicit earnings on total contributions are in effect sav- 
ing out of  before-tax income and benefits are received tax free. For em- 
ployee plans, some and typically all of  contributions and all of  earnings 
are saving out of  before-tax income and benefits are taxable as received. 
Allocations of  income to personal saving, in  contrast, are out of  after- 
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mulated  balances is tax free. Thus, as compared  with personal  saving, 
saving through employee plans permits  tax deferral and through OASI 
exemption of income from tax.  Implicitly,  the Feldstein  and Pellechio 
and the Munnell measured  substitution  elasticities  reflect these relative 
tax treatments. Taking into account explicitly and accurately the relative 
tax treatments would require better data than are now available. 
8.2.2  Generalizing the Estimates 
Both Feldstein  and Pellechio and Munnell generalize their results to 
the estimation of  the effects of  pension plans on aggregate national sav- 
ing. The generalizations are of  doubtful validity. The question raised by 
Barro remains unanswered:  do pensions substitute for personal saving 
or for transfers?  The issue is  not easily resolved  because  the substitu- 
tion of  pensions for direct transfers is confounded with changes in family 
organization and the participation  of  individuals in the wage labor  and 
nonwage  labor  forces.  For  extended  families  without  pension  plans, 
entry into the labor force and retirement  are less well defined than for 
nuclear  families with  pension  plans.  In a  lifetime  planning  model  for 
nuclear families, labor supply decisions and savings decisions are related 
through  the effect of  labor  supply decisions  on the amount of  income 
which  may  be  allocated  to consumption  averaging  in  any  period  and 
through the length of time over which savings may be accumulated. For 
extended families, one substitutes transfers for savings in these relation- 
ships. The relationship between labor supply and consumption decisions 
is recognized by Barro, Feldstein  and Pellechio  and Munnell but none 
accounts  adequately  for the likely variation  in  the relationship  that is 
associated  with  differences  in  family  organization.  Feldstein  and  Pel- 
lechio and Munnell recognize  that there is a problem  and the problem 
is the whole point of  Barro’s analysis but available data will not permit 
an explicit treatment. 
A second limitation on generalization is  that both  the Feldstein and 
Pellechio and Munnell estimates are for only subsets of  the population. 
From the total Survey of  Financial Characteristics of  Consumers sample, 
Feldstein  and Pellechio screen  out high  and  low income  units,  young 
and old, the self-employed and units with female heads. They run their 
regressions  on middle  income units  with  middle-aged  male  heads who 
indicated  in  the survey  that they  planned no bequests.  Munnell  intro- 
duces  a  variable into her  equations for  National  Longitudinal  Survey 
men aged 45-59 in 1966 to indicate whether they did or did not intend 
to make bequests. Either procedure is a way, although crude, of  classify- 
ing  survey  respondents  into  lifetime  savers  and  nonsavers.  Munnell 
probably had an inadequate representation of  lifetime nonzero savers in 
her sample; she casts out five  rather  obvious nonzero  savers.  The be- 308  Nelson McClung 
questing variable is significant in all equations and, thus, if  a unit intends 
a bequest,  its  saving will  be  greater, other  things  equal.  Nevertheless, 
however good the estimates may be for families with middle-aged male 
heads, they may not accurately reflect the behavior of  other families. 
A third limitation is  that substitutions  among forms of  saving have 
differential effects on ffows of  funds to loan markets.  One dollar saved 
by a family in the purchase of  a noncontingent,  transferable future in- 
terest adds one dollar to the flow of  funds available to finance capital 
accumulation. One dollar saved through an employee pension plan may 
add much less  than  one dollar  to  that  flow of  funds.  Pension  capital 
markets saving is  done not by  families but  by  pension  plans.  Not  all 
pension plans are advance funded; some other than  OASDHI are cur- 
rent funded and, hence, save nothing. A plan that is advance funded will 
not save if  (a) it has funded all past service obligations and  (b) it has 
a stable membership. Strictly, there are a few other conditions on zero 
saving but the point is that plans make funds available to capital mar- 
kets  only  when  they are striving to satisfy  a  funding  standard.  Were 
plans to adopt an endowment standard of  funding, as Feldstein has sug- 
gested for OASI, that would set off  a new saving process even for plans 
now fully advance funded. Thus it is that a family may substitute  one 
dollar of  pension saving for other saving but the pension plan drop less 
than one dollar into the capital accumulation kitty. 
Fourth, we must recognize that apart from the degree of  funding, pen- 
sion plans are a more efficient device than personal saving for insuring 
against interruptions  in  wage  income.  If  each  family  is  self-insuring, 
each will feel impelled  to provide for something approaching the worst 
case. But a group plan can play the odds and finance payments to those 
of  its members who suffer the most costly experience (for example, live 
the longest in retirement)  from the excess contributions  made by those 
members of  the group who have the least costly outcomes. So a shift in 
provision for interruptions of  income from individual to group plans will 
reduce national saving even in a lifetime zero saving model. 
In principle, we need to account independently for changes in family 
organization  and the substitution  of  saving for  transfers,  the  inherent 
efficiency of  group income averaging plans and the degree of  plan  fund- 
ing of  accruing liabilities. The amount which plans save even if  they are 
funding properly will not be equal to the increase in the present value of 
pension assets as viewed by families. What we can expect is that growth 
of  pension coverage will reduce aggregate saving, for a given level of  in- 
come security. The question is, how much? Estimating merely the effect 
of  accruing pension  claims  on other  saving by  families overstates  the 
effect. Measuring the offsets to this effect is not easy. If  we had the data, 
we could construct and estimate a model which would show what  sub- 
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rate. Then if  we should find that we can affect the substitution elasticity 
through tax policy, we would  have a  rule for the optional taxation  of 
pension saving. 
8.3  New Data 
In sections 8.1 and 8.2 I have attempted to define a  policy analysis 
problem.  The results  of  section  8.2 reveal  an unsatisfactory  state  of 
knowledge. Actually, we do not know what is the effect of  pension sav- 
ing on total saving. The purpose of  this section is to suggest a remedy. 
Like all  arguments,  this  one starts  from  an  axiom:  if  you  want  to 
know what people have done and why, go out and ask them. The Cen- 
sus Bureau survey program, merely deficient on the what, is hopeless on 
the why. Yet survey questions on motives  are not hypothetical  nor are 
respondents without  readily  retrievable information.  Because it is  pos- 
sible to ask meaningful questions on motives,  policy analysts  need  not 
be forced  to  fit  behavior  into  always  oversimplified  rational  action 
models. What we  need  is  a responsive survey  vehicle.  It should  be a 
flexible instrument which permits appropriate respondents to be selected 
and the right questions to be asked of  them for any of  a wide range of 
intensive data collection efforts. Routinized data collection for the con- 
struction of  time series is the bane of  policy analysis. This paper tries to 
make persuasive the case for a job order survey program by developing 
one of  many examples of  policy problems whose  resolution  requires  a 
one-time data collection effort. 
8.3.1  Interfamily and Intrafamily Transfers 
In the analysis of  the effects of  pension saving on total personal sav- 
ing our most basic data requirement  is for information  on transfers  of 
income between or among persons. The larger are interview  units  (the 
more inclusive the concept of  the family), the more these transfers will 
be intrafamily, and the smaller are interview  units  (the more exclusive 
the concept of  the family), the more these transfers will be interfamily. 
Interfamily or intrafamily, the transfers to be measured are those which 
serve the purpose for a family of  averaging consumption over time or, 
more accurately, reducing the variance in  the consumptions  of  a  series 
of  time periods.  It is  these transfers  which  substitute for pension  and 
other  saving.  What  we  want  are cross-section  data  on  transfers  and 
pension  and nonpension  saving for persons  with  and  without  pension 
coverage.  We can  measure  accurately the  effect of  pension  saving  on 
total saving only if  we can control for transfers. The extended family is 
not extinct and a useful survey would enable an analyst to control for 
degrees  of  extendedness through measured  interfamily  and  intrafamily 
transfers.  It  may  be that the transfer  effect is  not significant  but it is 310  Nelson McClung 
better  scientific procedure  to  measure  the effect than  merely  to assert 
that it is of no consequence. 
At the least, we  must  control for family organization.  Without this, 
there is no way to measure accurately an entirely appropriate concept of 
transfers. We would  find ourselves  attempting  to measure the value  of 
the consumption of  a live-in grandmother net of  the value of  the child 
care and other services which she provides. But we must recognize that 
a more inclusive family normally will have a smaller savings requirement 
than a less inclusive one. The more inclusive family has more degrees of 
freedom in averaging income over family members. It has a lower level 
of  uncovered risk. Other things, such as age, sex composition and self- 
employment being equal, we would expect large families to save less, at 
least per head, than small ones. The rates at which large and small fami- 
lies substitute pension  and  other  saving likely  differ.  If  large families 
can more nearly meet their requirements for income averaging through 
direct as opposed  to mediated  transfers,  they should be less willing to 
trade pension for other saving; their other saving will be prompted more 
strongly than for small families by  considerations  other than  reduction 
of  the variance in consumption over time. 
But we can collect some information on the financial relationships of 
members  of  a household  and the financial relationships between  those 
persons and persons in all other households in the world. If  persons in 
one household are making transfers to a person in another household, it 
is the transfer that is significant. The fact that the recipient is the wife’s 
third cousin, twice removed, whatever that may mean, is of  subordinate 
importance. There is no doubt that eliciting accurate responses  to ques- 
tions on interpersonal transfers will not be easy. Payments made for the 
upkeep of  paramours or of  love children kept out of  sight may  not be 
known to the respondent or, if  known, a source of  some embarrassment. 
Of  course, one would not ask of  each respondent, “Do you keep a par- 
amour?” One might ask  (a) “Did this family last year  make any pay- 
ments directly to persons  in other families?”  (b) “If  so, what was  the 
amount of  payment to each person?”  (c) “What is the relationship of 
that person to persons in this family?” (d) “What was the reason for the 
payment?’’ This suggested approach no doubt would miss much of  the 
payments  to paramours,  which in  the main,  perhaps,  are consumption 
and not transfers. It should yield reliable data on transfers and purchases 
of  services which are free of  moral taint  and those surely are most  of 
such payments. 
8.3.2  Transfers Out and Consumption 
Payments made by a family and not otherwise classifiable are either 
transfers  or consumption  expenditures  but  it  is  not  always  apparent 
which.  However,  questions may be asked in a survey which will  assist 
in  a proper classification. Thus, for example, one might  ask about the 311  Relevance in Economic Measurement: Public Inheritances 
frequency of  church attendance. If  attendance is frequent, payments to 
the church might be classified as consumption  expenditures  (purchases 
of church services) ;  if  infrequent, as transfers. Property  taxes paid  by 
families which  have children  in  elementary  or secondary  government 
schools might be classified as consumption expenditures; by other fami- 
lies, as transfers. This is, of  course, too simple because property taxes 
buy government services other than schooling. 
Questions  can be asked  which  would  enable us to make inferences 
with some confidence as to whether an apparent transfer transaction was 
in fact an exchange transaction or not. Although these inferences cannot 
be made with high  confidence,  any improvement  over present practice 
would  be welcome.  In current  tax  and  statistical accounting,  transfers 
out  through  taxes  are  overstated  and  consumption  expenditures  are 
understated and, in the treatment of  contributions  of  many  sorts, con- 
sumption expenditures are understated in tax accounting and overstated 
in  statistical accounting. Consumption expenditures, of  course,  include 
consumer surpluses  (transfers in)  and monopoly  rents  paid  (transfers 
out possibly but not necessarily)  but the failure to identify these trans- 
fers does not have so great a distorting effect in analyses of  family eco- 
nomic decisions as the arbitrary classification  of  all taxes  as transfers 
out, even though they buy personal consumption goods and services; all 
charitable contributions as consumption  outlays, even  though  they are 
made under duress and buy  only peace of  mind; and  all outlays by  a 
family on consumption goods and services as consumption expenditures, 
even though the family is making in-kind contributions to the support of 
persons in another family. 
Classifying what  are properly  consumption  expenditures as transfers 
out, we understate family disposable income and understate family con- 
sumption. If  the classification errors were uniform over all families, the 
errors  introduced  into estimated  behavioral  parameters  would  not  be 
serious. But the classification errors are not uniform.  The transfer ele- 
ment in payments to churches probably  is substantially greater for the 
rich than for the poor. But it is in the misclassification of  state and local 
taxes that the confounding of  effects in the data is a major impediment 
to statistical analysis.  In present  practice,  the family with  a child in a 
private school has a larger consumption  outlay than  another otherwise 
the same with a child in a government school. The proportion of  a fam- 
ily’s state and local taxes  which  is  properly  a consumption  outlay  de- 
pends upon a number of  attributes but the variation over families other- 
wise similar is quite large. 
8.3.3  Transfers Out and Saving 
The first problem  is whether employee pension contributions  should 
be classified as taxes or saving. If  a person as a condition for employ- 
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pension  credits  which  he  purchases  with  his  contributions  are  worth 
nothing to him, the payments in effect are taxes and not saving. That he 
may later revalue the credits is another matter. The valuation of  pension 
credits I take up in section  8.3.6, although  valuation  of  the credits is 
the prior issue. The classification problem arises in the treatment of  em- 
ployee  pension  contributions  where  a  person  does  not  have  effective 
access to jobs not entailing employee contributions  and, in  certain cir- 
cumstances,  employer contributions.  In the  simplest  case, the  issue  is 
whether FICA contributions are taxes or saving.  It is  possible that for 
the young worker  they are taxes, for mid-career  workers  partly  taxes 
and partly  saving and are fully saving only for older workers,  such as 
those included in the Munnell data base. It may be, of  course, that the 
contributions are in fact transfers out which substitute for other transfers 
out  (the support  of  aged  parents)  which  need  not  be made  because 
FICA contributions are being made. For either case, the crucial question 
is  each person’s  attitude toward the payments made.  In an analysis  of 
family spending decisions we  want  to know whether  pension  contribu- 
tions are an allocation of  income or a constraint: does the budget to be 
allocated include income before pension contributions  or after pension 
contributions? This need not remain  a conundrum. We can  ask  survey 
respondents questions which reveal their  attitudes toward pension  con- 
tributions. 
A second but not unrelated problem is whether saving should be mea- 
sured on an accrual or realization accounting. Pension saving has little 
meaning outside an accrual accounting framework. Pension saving may 
be measured in one or the other of  two ways. As a first measure, we may 
take plan contributjons by  employer and employee plus current period 
earnings on accumulated funds that are attributable to an employee. An 
alternative measure which may yield quite different results is to take the 
difference between beginning and end of  period valuations which a fam- 
ily makes of  its accumulated pension credits. Both are accrual concepts. 
Relating pension saving measured  either way  to  realized  income,  total 
budget allocations may exceed or fall short of  the budget to be allocated. 
So we  require  measurements  of  incomes  and  outlays which  are  con- 
sistently on accrual  accounting.  This  isn’t  impossible;  merely  difficult. 
Adding to employee income employer plan contributions and plan earn- 
ings,  two  major elements  of  accrual income  neglected  in  a  realization 
accounting,  would  entail  two-stage  surveying. We  would  administer  a 
questionnaire to families and, for those with plan coverage, send a ques- 
tionnaire to  their  employers  asking for employer  contributions  on be- 
half  of  the  covered  worker  and  the  worker’s  share  of  plan  earnings. 
From an interest  in evaluating employee attitudes  toward  pensions  we 
might ask the employer  (or the  insurance  company)  for  the value of 
the employee’s pension accumulation, although as I point out in section 313  Relevance in Economic Measurement: Public Inheritances 
8.3.6 it is the employee’s valuation, not the plan’s valuation of  the pen- 
sion accumulation, that is relevant in any explanation of  employee saving 
behavior. 
8.3.4  Transfers In and Wages 
In the estimation of  a lifetime saving equation, one introduces a cur- 
rent period wage income variable in order to sort people into compar- 
able stages of  their lifetime income paths. One introduces an unemploy- 
ment  variable to sort people  into  those who  are  on  their  paths from 
those who  are off  their  paths in  the current period. Another variable, 
expected lifetime wage income, sorts people into path  levels. The cur- 
rent and expected income variables together identify the path in  “nor- 
mal” cases. Expected lifetime wage income for most families determines 
their  lifetime consumption plan. The income pattern  together with  the 
consumption plan determines current period saving. What has been left 
out thus  far is  the  influence of  wealthholdings  and  property  income, 
which I take up in section 8.3.5,  and whether a family is or is not a life- 
time net zero saving unit, which I take up in section 8.3.7. 
Estimated relationships depend upon  the  accuracy with  which  wage 
income is measured. Current survey data enable us to make certain re- 
classifications. We can, if  we wish, reclassify AFDC as wage income. We 
would  do less well reclassifying alimony and child support as wage in- 
come. Only by arbitrary rules can we reclassify wage income as property 
income. Reclassifications can be improved by collecting income data in 
sufficient detail. For the rest, it is  a matter of  collecting data which give 
us  a basis for inferring whether  an income receipt is wages,  a  transfer 
or a participation in profits. 
Current survey  data give us  very  little  information  for valuing  and 
adding  to  family  wage  income  the  wage  income  of  members  that  is 
earned in home production. An obvious expedient is to classify families 
into units of  (a) one earner, one adult; (b) one earner, two adults; and 
(c) two earners, and estimate for each class separately. Imputing home 
wage income to family income is  a preferable  procedure but only if  it 
can be done with reasonable accuracy. The basic problem is  valuation. 
There are two valuation rules:  opportunity cost (what the home worker 
could  earn in  the best  alternative  employment)  and  replacement  cost 
(what it would cost to hire persons outside the home to perform each 
of  the several tasks). With  relevant information  on  the  home  worker, 
the opportunity cost valuation is feasible. It might be possible to make 
replacement cost valuations by using  data collected  for families  which 
hire much help to impute costs to families which  hire little. 
Current survey wage income fails to include  quite  a  bit  of  realized 
market wage income, such as employer contributions  to life and health 
insurance plans and the value of  employee consumption paid for by em- 314  Nelson McClung 
ployers. If  these errors of  measurement were distributed uniformly over 
all employees, estimated relationships  would  be wrong only by  a con- 
stant. The distribution, however,  is  far from  uniform  and  policy  pre- 
scriptions are likely to go astray on implicit weighting effects. But, not 
only is there missing realized income; data now collected do not enable 
us  to construct  an accrual  concept  of  wage  income for families.  The 
main missing element is  employer contributions to and earnings of  pen- 
sion plans, including OASDHI, or, alternatively, the change in the pres- 
ent value of  pension rights less own current contributions. To combine a 
wealth variable or variables which include pension wealth with a current 
wage income variable which does not include employer contributions to 
plans will bias the effects on saving both of  wealth currently held and of 
labor income. But only better data will make it possible  to correct the 
error. 
From current survey data we  have no  information  on  expected  in- 
come. For estimating lifetime savings models, the practice is  to infer ex- 
pected income from recent past income and other information. The in- 
ferred expected income may vary widely from family  expectations  be- 
cause the family has information and attitudes toward the future which 
are not  taken  into  account. Yet  it  is  not  unreasonable  to ask  people 
questions about their income expectations. There is nothing hypothetical 
in such questions. What we want is each family’s expectation. That is the 
relevant information.  What we may guess is their objective expectation 
is not relevant. They act on the basis of  their expectations however in- 
accurate or even logically inconsistent those expectations may appear. 
8.3.5  Property and Property Income 
Property income usually does not enter explicitly into lifetime saving 
models. Net wealth currently held enters as an element of  total resources 
available to support the consumption plan. A family, of  course, cannot 
spend both principal and interest but it can spend  the interest  as long 
as the principal  is held and spend the principal  at the sacrifice of the 
interest. In the extreme case, there may be a few families which finance 
their consumption plans entirely from property income. If they  neither 
add to nor subtract from the capital, they are lifetime net zero savers. In 
the design of  lifetime saving models there seems to be some uncertainty 
about the proper treatment of  property income.  If  it is to be included 
explicitly, then it needs to be measured. 
In  family  survey  data now  available  property  income  is  seriously 
underreported and apparently in a very nonuniform manner  (McClung, 
Koenig, Barkerding  1973). We  have  two  usable  surveys of  wealth  in 
the past two decades, the latest over ten years old. Apart from their age, 
both surveys, but especially the Survey of  Economic Opportunity, have 
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of  Consumers  and  of Changes in Family  Finances, the survey sample 
frames were or are inappropriate. Because of  that and nonresponse, the 
surveys miss the rich and much of their income and wealth. The samples 
should be drawn from lists of  persons whose income at least is known. 
It may not be possible to reduce nonresponse very much but it is pos- 
sible to use more effectively information collected from respondents to- 
gether with information from administrative records  to impute missing 
income and wealth to nonrespondents. 
There is one very important source of  income on which  the surveys 
make no attempt to collect  data. This is the  current period  accrual of 
capital  gains.  Logically,  in  a  savings  model,  the  current  accrual  of 
capital gain appears on both sides of  the equation: it is a component of 
income and a component of  saving.  Failure to include the current ac- 
crual of  gain on both sides of  the equation will yield an unbiased esti- 
mate of  the parameter relating saving to income only if  the true value 
of that parameter is 1.0. Accruals of  capital gains are substitutable for 
other saving.  A  person  may provide  for his  retirement  or meet  other 
savings objectives as well through accruals of  gain as through other sav- 
ing, allowance being made for uncertainty. Most families with  substan- 
tial accruals of  gain no doubt are not lifetime zero savers, but the Trea- 
sury  at least,  good  shepherd that it is,  is  more  concerned  with  those 
which are outside that fold than with those which are safely within.  To 
measure  current  accruals  of  capital  gains  we  need  observations  on 
beginning  and  end  of  period  market  values  and  current  period  net 
transactions. With gross transactions we could relate gain realizations to 
accruals. This does not necessarily imply two interviews. Two interviews 
might improve  the quality  of  the  responses,  but  if  two  interviews  im- 
prove the second response more than the first, one interview may mea- 
sure changes in values better. 
8.3.6  Valuation of  Future Interests 
There are two rules for valuing assets  (or debts). The first is to use 
current  market  values.  The second  is  to  discount  to  the  present  the 
stream of  future net incomes (or outlays). These two rules would yield 
identical results were capital markets perfect. Capital markets not being 
perfect, a choice must be made. Regarding assets (or debts) as positive 
(or negative) resources for financing consumption plans, one encounters 
a logical problem in aggregating market values; not everyone could sell 
his assets without driving prices to zero or call his debts without causing 
prices to rise very high.  In microanalysis, there is  no problem because 
we consider  the affairs of  but one family; the  affairs  of  all others are 
assumed to remain unchanged. In the case of  discount values,  there is 
a question of  whether streams of  net income would  continue if  no one 
were  willing  to pay  anything  for  them.  In  real  terms,  some  streams 316  Nelson McClung 
would continue. Only the stark empiricist would insist that a flower is 
less fragrant because it wastes its fragrance on the desert air. Neverthe- 
less, metaphysics aside, the custom in analysis of  saving decisions is  to 
use discount values primarily because certain forms of  wealth, not be- 
ing traded, have no market value. 
The difficulty in using present values of  future interests is finding the 
correct rates of  discount. Theoretical analyses run in terms of  time rates 
of discount weighted by various risk factors. A person’s rate of  discount 
for time and risk is not directly observable but in equilibrium it is  equal 
to a market yield. Market yields are observable but vary from one lender 
and borrower to another. An obvious solution and one which avoids any 
assumptions  about the perfection  of  capital markets and errors of  im- 
plicit weighting is  to ask  survey respondents  what  they  paid  for funds 
raised recently. If  they borrowed, that is the borrowing rate; if  they sold 
assets, it is the lending rate sacrificed. If  the family both borrowed and 
sold  assets  or borrowed  at several  rates  or  sold  assets  with  different 
sacrificed yields, we might  take a weighted  average of  the rates  as the 
measure  of  its  opportunity  cost  of  funds.  Having  asked  these  ques- 
tions, we could then discount future incomes and outlays at rates which 
are appropriate to each family. 
That is  one way out. There is another. It is simply to ask families to 
value their assets and debts. Now we will worry of  course that the fami- 
lies will not get the values right; that is, they will not assign the value to 
an asset that we would assign or that the market has assigned to it. But 
a family is as rich as it thinks it is  and makes its consumption and sav- 
ings decisions  with reference  to its subjective wealth,  not  its  objective 
wealth.  Taking this way  out, we get values directly  and  discount rates 
only implicitly. Since we  have no interest  in discount rates  at least in 
this context, we lose nothing. We would still require rates for discount- 
ing expected wage income, unless we  asked families for present  values. 
The major difficulty with  the  procedure is assuring ourselves  that the 
family decision  makers  are in  fact  agreed  on subjective values.  It will 
not do for the wife to think that the family has a net wealth of $100,000 
and the husband to think that its wealth  is  $200,000. And  this is true 
whether we interview husband  or wife unless  the one interviewed is a 
thoroughgoing  autocrat. When we  weight these  subjective wealths,  we 
will discover discrepancies between  the resulting national estimates and 
estimates derived by  other methods.  However, we will  not  be  able to 
say that the survey results are wrong, at least for behavioral analyses. 
It is likely that people in general value noncontingent, transferable fu- 
ture interests at near their market value. The measurement problem there 
is that the respondent is not fully informed about the number of  units in 
the stock held.  But,  with respect to contingent,  nontransferable future 
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tions.  The young possibly value retirement  pensions, for example, at a 
fraction of their objective worth while persons close to the end of  their 
working lives may  overvalue  them.  A  perfectly  satisfactory reason  for 
asking survey respondents for their valuations and, in addition, collecting 
data for making objective valuations is that we do not know how people 
value  their  assets  and  debts. We  may  be substantially  in  error  if  we 
assume that they are well informed and completely objective. 
8.3.7  Estate Building Plans 
Presently we have very limited data on transfers by gift and bequest. 
The principal sources of  these data are tax returns, on which the trans- 
fers are underreported. The Federal Gift Tax may be regarded as not a 
tax on gifts but a gift of  tax to the federal government. The matching of 
Federal Estate Tax returns with decedent and heir Personal Income Tax 
returns, now  being made by  the  IRS Statistics  Division, will  improve 
significantly our understanding of  transfers by bequest for the approxi- 
mately 7 percent of  the population  which  leaves  significant estates.  It 
would be helpful to have more complete data on bequests and gifts. 
However, for estimating a lifetime saving model, actual bequests and 
gifts paid are irrelevant. What we require is information on current plans 
for transferring  wealth  by gift  and bequest.  Essentially,  it is  plans  for 
wealth  transfers  by  bequest  and  gift  which  separate  lifetime  positive 
savers from lifetime zero savers. To the extent that gifts substitute  for 
bequests, information  on gifts assists in the classification. Again, much 
depends upon motives. Only from a knowledge  of  motives can we sort 
gifts from support. And  the knowledge of  motives  can be acquired.  A 
survey can ask respondents if  they plan to make transfers in the future 
and, if  so, whether  the transfers  are intended  as consumption  support 
or capital grants. Asking respondents  about their transfer  plans is a lot 
better  than  guessing  that  gifts  made  after  some advanced  age  are an 
alternative to bequests and, hence, are capital grants and that transfers 
made prior  to that age are consumption  support or capital grants de- 
pending upon the size of  the transfer. The fact is  that each respondent 
has more relevant information than an analyst is likely to have. A person 
at age 30 who expects to die in a few years may make gifts which, how- 
ever IRS auditors may later decide, in fact are in  anticipation  of death, 
and an 80-year-old who expects to live for 10 years more may not make 
gifts because he thinks that he has time remaining before the burden of 
proof  shifts. 
While we are asking respondents for their planned  transfers out, we 
should ask them for actual and expected transfers in through inheritance, 
gift and support. Expected inheritances should affect current period sav- 
ing in much the same way as expected wage income but, in any case, we 
make  a  mistake  in  supposing that they  have no effect.  Any  effect, of 318  Nelson McClung 
course, applies only to that small fraction of  the total population which 
expects to receive inheritances. However, that small population accounts 
for much of  family saving. More generally, we should try to identify the 
sources of  a  family’s acquisition  of  its  current  holdings  of  future  in- 
terests.  Future  interests  acquired  through  gift  and  inheritance  and 
through current funded and mature advance funded pension plans con- 
tribute nothing to aggregate saving. Only accumulations out of  current 
income  have  a  full  effect;  accumulations  through  immature  advance 
funded plans have a partial effect. In explaining family saving, we should 
try to separate out that saving which adds to the supply of  funds avail- 
able for capital accumulation from that  saving which does not. Saving 
through  a current funded  pension  plan,  OASI for example, is  genuine 
saving to a family paying FICA tax but, to a family in receipt of a pen- 
sion, the transaction may be and possibly should be regarded as a trans- 
fer in. From the viewpoint  of  the national economy the transaction  is 
entirely  a  transfer.  If  this  macrotransfer  reduces  macrosaving  through 
its effect on microaccumulations out of  current income, then there is a 
cause €or concern. That concern should find its first expression  in  the 
collection of  better data for analysis of  the issue. 
Notes 
1.  Martin  Feldstein  (1977)  reviews research prior  to  1978  and  considers its 
implications for economic growth. 
2. The  survey program is  being  developed jointly  by  the  Census Bureau and 
the Department of  Health and Human Services. Under  current plans, the  survey 
program will become operational in  1982. 
3. In U.S. Treasury Department 1977, there  is an extended treatment of  institu- 
tional concepts of  income. 
4. For an empirical analysis, see Eugene Steuerle 1975. 
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